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Abstract: A recent analysis of the potential for management cost recovery in the UK suggested that such a policy would be 
detrimental to UK fishers if other European countries did not implement a similar charging policy. Most of the waters 
exploited by UK fishers are also exploited by fishers from other European member states, and hence the additional cost 
burden on the UK fishers may result in some boats leaving the fishery. In the longer term, the reduced effort may result in 
stock recovery, providing increased benefits to the remaining vessels. However, in an international fishery, these benefits 
may also accrue to boats that have not been subjected to the cost recovery charge. In this paper, a bioeconomic model of the 
English Channel fisheries is used to assess the effects of introducing a unilateral management cost recovery levy on UK boats 
on the competitiveness and long term structure of both the UK and French fleets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Management cost recovery has been introduced in a range 
of countries, including Australia (Department of Primary 
Industries and Energy 1994, Kaufmann and Geen 1997), 
Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 1995), 
Iceland (Arnason 1993), New Zealand (NZ Department of 
Fisheries 1997), South Africa (Sea Fisheries 1997), and the 
USA (Office of Sustainable Fisheries 1997).
1 The system of 
cost recovery varies in these countries, but generally is 
based on either a percentage of the landed value or a charge 
per management unit.  
 
In all these cases, the fisheries are specific to a single 
country. While foreign fleets may operate in the exclusive 
economic zones of these countries, their activity is heavily 
regulated. Further, they are generally charged an access fee 
to cover not only the cost of management, but also to 
extract an element of resource rent. 
 
The situation facing fisheries in the European Union is 
quite different. While the fleets of Member States have 
exclusive access to their territorial waters (i.e. the first 12 
miles from the low tide mark), most economic activity takes 
place in the waters subject to shared access (i.e. beyond the 
12 mile zone but within the 200 mile exclusive economic 
zone). Fisheries management regulations in this area are 
globally imposed at the European level, but the 
management and enforcement of these regulations are the 
responsibility of the individual Member States. For 
example, the UK is responsible for licensing its own fleet, 
monitoring its activity and enforcing the catch limits 
imposed by the quota system. 
 
At present, management cost recovery in Europe is largely 
limited to nominal administration charges for processing 
                                                        
1 A recent review of all of these cost recovery systems is 
given in Hatcher and Pascoe (1998) and Andersen et al 
(1998). 
licences etc. Even these cost are not being recovered in all 
Member States. However, the high cost of managing 
fisheries relative to their economic contribution (generally 
less than 1 per cent of GDP) has called into question the 
advisability of continuing these subsidies. 
 
A potential problem arises, however, if only one Member 
State introduces a management charge when its fleet 
competes with others for a shared stock. While higher costs 
are likely to reduce effort with consequent longer-term 
economic benefits to the industry, these benefits may not 
accrue to the Member State who imposed the charges. 
Instead, some (if not most) of these benefits may accrue to 
other fleets that do not introduce a charge and do not incur a 
subsequent effort reduction. As a result, the incentive is to 
wait until after other countries impose management cost 
recovery charges.  
 
In this paper, a model of a European fishery (the English 
Channel) is used to investigate the effects of imposing 
management cost recovery charges on the fleet of one 
Member State only (the UK). In particular, the analysis will 
focus on the long term effects on fleet structure, and the re-
allocation of any potential benefits arising from the charges.  
 
 
2.  COST RECOVERY CHARGES 
 
Cost recovery as a goal in fisheries management is 
normally taken to mean charging the users of the resource 
for the public costs of management.
2 These may include all 
the public costs mentioned above, or perhaps just the costs 
of administration and enforcement, depending on the views 
of policy-makers about who should pay for the provision of 
public good services such as research and some 
enforcement activity. The rationale for cost recovery is that 
fishers are the main beneficiaries of management and hence 
the industry should bear at least a part of the costs of 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Kaufmann and Geen (1997). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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providing these services. The extent to which the industry 
should be made to pay for management may, however, 
depend upon the views of policy-makers about public 
support for private industry in general and for the fishing 
industry in particular. 
 
There are two principal categories of charges that could be 
applied to fishers. These are charges made for access to the 
fishery and charges made according to the amount of use of 
the fishery resource.  
 
Access charges 
 
Access (or entry) charges are charges which are made 
simply for access to the fishery and which therefore take no 
account of the actual amount of use that is made of the 
resource. An obvious example would be an annual licence 
fee. 
 
Access charges are the simplest type of charge to 
administer, particularly where entry is already restricted by 
means of a licensing scheme. However, the fact that access 
charges take no direct account of resource use means that 
they run the risk of being inequitable. They tend to have a 
proportionately greater financial impact on smaller vessels, 
who generally take less of the resource than larger vessels.
3  
 
To counter this effect, an annual access charge can be 
scaled according to some parameter related to the fixed 
costs of effort, such as the size of the vessel or its engine 
power (or indeed to the actual capital value of the vessel). 
This is the case in Australian fisheries, where the 
management cost recovery levy is determined on a per unit 
basis
4. The levy paid by the fisher is the product of the per-
unit charge and the number of units attached to the boat. 
Any charge that is effectively a variable tax on a particular 
component of effort, however, may cause fishers to 
substitute the taxed component with a greater input of some 
other component that is not taxed. The extent to which such 
input substitution might occur, however, will depend on the 
constraints imposed by existing management regulations as 
well as the cost structure of the industry and the size of the 
tax. 
 
Use charges 
 
Use charges are variable charges which are made according 
to the amount of use that is made of the resource. Resource 
use, however, may be defined either directly in terms of 
output (the amount of fish that is caught and landed) or 
indirectly in terms of inputs (one or more components of 
                                                        
3 This is also true for less skilled fishers or those using less 
efficient methods. However, as increasing the efficiency of 
the fishery is often a goal of management, such a charge 
could be seen as a tool to help achieve this objective. 
4 This is a function of hull capacity and engine power. 
effort). In practice, however, these charges have only been 
levied on outputs. 
 
Output or landings taxes (charged on an ad valorem basis) 
will in principle reduce revenues for all fishers by the same 
proportion and so should be equitable. They should also be 
non-distortionary with respect to costs and so should have 
no effect on the efficiency of individual firms. Marginal 
fishers, however, would again be expected to be forced out 
of the fishery to an extent depending on the tax rate set. In 
the long run the total value of output would be expected to 
be reduced by an amount that would depend on a number of 
factors including the cost structure of the firms remaining in 
the industry. 
 
 
3.  UK MANAGEMENT COSTS AND COST 
RECOVERY OPTIONS IN THE ENGLISH 
CHANNEL 
 
In 1996-97, the cost of management in the UK were 
estimated to be in the order of £45m (Table 1). Ideally, 
management cost recovery should aim to recover the 
marginal opportunity costs of providing additional services 
(Andersen et al 1998). However, in practice this is not 
possible. Only total, rather than marginal, cost information 
is available. Further, while the UK costs are disaggregated 
into main activities, these costs are not identified on a 
regional or fishery basis. Hence, it is not possible to 
determine if the costs vary from fishery to fishery. As a 
result, it is necessary to assume that the costs of 
management are equally distributed across the UK, and that 
cost recovery can be most efficiently undertaken based of 
an average cost per unit of activity in the fishery (rather 
than cost per unit of service supplied).  
 
Table 1. UK fisheries management costs, 1996-97 
Management activity  Cost 
($m) 
Monitoring and enforcement  £24.2 
Administration £4.2 
Research and development  £16.5 
  
Total £44.9 
Source: Hatcher and Pascoe (1998) 
 
Given this assumption, an access fee or use charge can be 
estimated based on the total UK fleet characteristics and the 
total value of landings. In order to recover £45m from the 
industry based on the fleet size and value of landings in 
1997, Hatcher and Pascoe (1998) estimated that the 
alternative charging options need to be either: 
 
x A flat licence fee of £6000 a boat; 
x A variable licence fee based on the number of 
VCUs
5, estimated to be £56/VCU; 
                                                        
5 Vessel Capacity Units – a management unit of capacity 
based on engine power and boat size. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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x An ad valorem charge on value of landings of all 
species (7.5%); or 
x An  ad valorem charge on value of landings of 
quota species only (10.5%). 
 
The choice of option has a significant effect on the amount 
of charges recovered from any particular fishery. For 
example, in the English Channel, which is characterised by 
a large number of small boats, charging £6000 a boat would 
raise about £12.9 million a year in revenue whereas 
charging £56/VCU would raise about £5 million a year. 
Consequently, a 7.5 per cent landings charge would raise 
about £5.25 million a year in revenue while a 10.5 per cent 
charge on the value of quota landings would be 
approximately £4.2 million a year. 
 
A model of the UK component of the Channel fishery 
(Pascoe 1997) was used to assess the effects of these 
different charges on the long run structure of the fishery. 
An assumption of the model was that the effort expended 
by other fleets in the Channel (e.g. the French fleet) 
remained constant. The model also did not allow for 
increased stock size through reduced effort (although the 
non-linear catch effort relationships in the model enabled a 
proportionally smaller decrease in catch with decreasing 
effort). 
 
The results of the model suggested that the least 
distortionary charge (in terms of relative changes in effort 
allocation) was an ad valorem tax on landings. However, as 
the charge increased the costs to fishers, total fleet numbers 
and catch decreased, requiring an even higher charge to 
recover the initial target level of management costs. For all 
charges examined, the fleet number decreased in response 
to the higher costs. 
 
While not explicitly examined in the original model, it was 
recognised that such charges would have adverse 
consequences for the competitiveness of UK fishers within 
European markets if fishers from other EU countries do not 
have to pay similar charges. The resultant effort reduction 
in the UK fleet would result, in the long run, in higher 
stocks and higher catch rates to all participants in the 
fishery, including those who did not incur the higher costs.  
 
As a result, an effect of a unilateral cost recovery charge 
may be an increase in economic rents accruing to fleets 
from countries that do not impose such charges. Under such 
a scenario, the industry in each respective country will no 
doubt pressure their governments not to impose such a 
charge in the hope that competing nations will impose a 
cost recovery charge on their fleets. In such a game, 
management costs will not be imposed. 
 
The extent to which unilateral management cost recovery 
will reduce the competitiveness of a fleet in an international 
fishery has yet to be tested empirically. Further, as most 
fleets are subject to some form of license limitation, the 
potential to benefit from higher costs in competing fleets is 
limited. In this study, a bioeconomic model of the English 
Channel fishery that includes long run stock dynamics and 
both the UK and French fleets is used to estimate the effects 
of imposing a cost recovery level on UK boats only. 
 
 
4.  DESCRIPTION OF THE BIOECONOMIC 
MODEL 
 
The bioeconomic model of the fishery used in this study 
was developed as an optimisation model. A detailed 
description of the general economic and biological 
relationships underlying the model is given in Pascoe 
(2000).  
 
The model is comprised of three interacting components: an 
effort component, a biological component and an economic 
component. 
 
The fishing effort component estimates the level of fishing 
effort by fleet, boat length class and métier. The UK and 
French fleets are subdivided into 23 sub-fleets based on 
their main fishing activities and location. These groups are 
further disaggregated into six size classes. These sub-fleets 
use differing combinations of seven principal gear types 
(beam trawl, otter trawl, mid-water trawl, dredge, lines, nets 
and pots). In total, 55 Channel métiers are explicitly 
included in the model with the other fishing activities in the 
Channel aggregated for the UK and France into 2 extra 
métiers. In addition, a further 12 external métier are 
included in the model, representing fishing activity that 
takes place outside of the Channel by the Channel fleet. 
 
The biological component of the model calculates the 
expected yield for the given level of standardised effort, 
using model parameters derived from reference year data 
(1993-95). A total of 53 different species (including 
separate stocks) are represented in the model. Catches of 
each species are estimated based on the level of fishing 
activity in each métier and the relative catchability in the 
métier.  
 
Age structured biological models were developed for 27 of 
the species. The models were incorporated as equilibrium 
yield-per-recruit models, with the equilibrium stock 
structure estimated for the given levels of effort. 
Recruitment was assumed constant, based on mean 
recruitment levels estimated using VPA (Virtual Population 
Analysis). For the remaining 26 species, surplus production 
yield curves were estimated from observed catch and effort 
levels in the fishery. 
 
The distribution of effort across the different métiers by 
each sub-fleet is assumed fixed, and was based on the 
observed distribution of effort of the boats over the period IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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1993-95. Many of the different métiers are exploited on a 
seasonal basis. It is assumed that the allocation of effort 
reflects the changes in abundance and relative profitability 
of the activities over the year. As the model has only an 
annual time frame, these seasonal effects are not 
represented in the model. 
 
Revenue is estimated based on the level of landings and the 
price. Running costs are determined as a function of 
revenue and the level of effort while fixed and capital costs 
are determined by the fleet size and structure. Revenues and 
costs determine the level of economic profits in the fishery, 
which in turn determines the optimal fleet size and 
configuration. Cost data were derived from economic 
surveys of the fishery. Price data were obtained from local 
landings statistics and auction markets. 
 
Several variants of the model were developed, including a 
simulation model (Ulrich and le Gallic 1999), and a multi-
objective optimisation model (Pascoe and Mardle 1999), 
The model used in this analysis was a single objective 
optimisation model based on the multi-objective model of 
Pascoe and Mardle (1999). The model was used to simulate 
the effects of a regulated open access fishery by 
maximising revenue subject to the constraint that the profits 
of each fleet are non-negative. In addition, upper bound 
constraints on boat numbers in each sub-fleet were imposed 
on the assumption that the current licensing system would 
prevent new entrants (except for replacement boats). As a 
result, long run boat numbers would be less than or equal to 
the existing number of boat. 
 
 
5.  MODEL SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
A number of policy simulations were run using the model. 
First, the model was run with the current fleet fixed in order 
to provide an indication of the current state of the fishery. 
From this, the current UK fleet is estimated to be earning an 
economic loss while the French fleet is accruing an 
economic profit (Table 2). These results are consistent with 
recent economic surveys of the fishery (Boncoeur and Le 
Gallic 1998, Coglan and Pascoe 2000). While non-labour 
costs are roughly equivalent between the French and UK 
Channel boats of the same size (Boncoeur et al 2000), 
average revenues of the French boats were considerably 
higher, particularly for the smaller size classes
6. 
 
As the UK fleet is not likely to continue to exist in its 
current form in the long run (due to the economic losses), 
                                                        
6 In 1996-97, the average revenues of French boats under 10 
metres in length were between 50 and 90 per cent higher 
than equivalent sized UK boats (Boncoeur et al 2000). As 
many small UK boats operate on a part time basis, this 
difference is largely a result of under-utilisation of the UK 
small boat segment. 
the model was run with the objective of revenue 
maximisation and the constraint that profits must be non-
negative. This is assumed to provide results consistent with 
the long run equilibrium in a regulated open access fishery. 
As would be expected, the estimated long run number of 
UK boats was less than the current number, with most of 
the decrease occurring in the smaller size classes (Figure 1). 
The reduction in UK boats was estimated to result in an 
increase in economic profits in the French fleet of around 8 
per cent, as the reduced effort eases the pressure on the 
stocks, resulting in higher average catch rates. 
 
Table 2. Benchmark simulations 
 Current  Long  run 
equilibrium 
7.5% levy 
UK only 
 
Revenue (…P￿     
x UK  155.8 152.1 146.6 
x France  257.6 261.1 264.9 
Economic profits (…P￿    
x UK  -6.1 0.0 0.0 
x France  31.7 34.1 36.0 
Costs recovered (…P￿    
x UK  - -  4.0 
x France  - - - 
Management Costs (…P￿    
x UK  18.5 11.6  6.6 
x France  15.1 14.8 14.8 
Total boat numbers    
x UK  2054 1285  738 
x France  1674 1646 1645 
Total employment    
x UK  4343 3215 2260 
x France  4840 4763 4762 
 
Introducing a levy of 7.5 per cent on the UK fleet was 
estimated to result in a further decrease in boat numbers 
(Table 2), again mostly smaller boats (Figure 1).
7 As a 
result, the economic profits of the French fleet increased by 
a further 6 per cent. 
 
The reduction in the UK fleet was estimated to result in 
lower fishing revenue and hence lower revenue raised from 
the levy. However, as the fleet size had decrease, 
presumably management costs would have decreased as 
well. Assuming that management costs are related to fleet 
size, then the ‘cost’ of managing the UK fleet would 
decline from …￿￿￿￿P XQGHU WKH FXUUHQW IOHHW VWUXFWXUH WR
…￿￿￿P XQGHU the estimated long run fleet with the 7.5 per 
cent levy
8. However, revenue collected by the levy was 
estimated to be only …￿P￿ 
 
The model was used to estimate the levy that would need to 
be charged in order to achieve the estimated management 
costs (which were assumed to be a function of boat 
numbers). This required varying the levy until the estimated 
                                                        
7 This result differs from that of Hatcher and Pascoe (1998), 
who found that such a levy had a lesser impact on the 
overall size of the UK fleet. 
8 This is based on £6000 a boat (Hatcher and Pascoe 1998). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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levy revenue was equal to the estimated management cost. 
From the results, a 10.5 per cent levy on UK revenue would 
be required to meet UK management costs. The effects of 
such a levy, however, would be to further decrease the size 
of the UK fleet (Figure 1), and further increase the profits 
of the French fleet (Table 3). Employment in the UK fleet 
would be less than 60 per cent of that of the long run 
equilibrium (Tables 2 and 3), while employment in the 
French fleet would be unaffected. 
 
Table 3. Effects of 10.5% management levies 
 Management  revenue 
equals management 
costs (UK only) 
levy 10.5% 
Both fleets incur 
levy of 10.5% 
Revenue (…P￿    
x UK  144.4 144.4 
x France  266.1 266.1 
Economic profits (…P￿  
x UK  0 0 
x France  36.6 21.8 
Costs recovered (…P￿  
x UK  5.4 5.4 
x France  - 24.8 
Management Costs (…P￿  
x UK  5.3 5.3 
x France  14.8 14.8 
Total boat numbers   
x UK  592 592 
x France  1645 1645 
Total employment   
x UK  1890 1890 
x France  4762 4762 
 
Imposing an equivalent levy on the French fleet, however, 
was estimated to have little effect on the size of the French 
fleet (Table 3), and hence provide no benefits to the UK 
fleet. This was because the French fleet was estimated to be 
making an economic surplus in the long run, and the cost 
recovery levy just reduced this surplus. If an equivalent 
levy was imposed on the French fleet, then the resultant 
revenue would exceed the estimated costs of management 
(based on the UK measure). Hence, an equivalent levy 
(10.5%) on the French boats would effectively contain a 
resource rent charge. As these boats are estimated to be 
making an economic surplus, such a charge may be 
justified. However, the equity argument for imposing an 
equivalent charge becomes distorted, as the UK boats are 
charged for management costs only. 
 
 
6.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results in this study are preliminary, but highlight some 
of the interesting challenges for management cost recovery 
in Europe.  
 
In the UK, many of the smaller boats operate on a part time 
basis. Pascoe (1997) estimated that around 90 per cent of 
UK boats under 7 metres were operated on a part time 
basis. 
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Figure 1. Effects of cost recovery levy on fleet structure 
 
These boats make up over half the UK under 10 metre fleet, 
and around one third of the total UK fleet. The persistence 
of these boats in the fleet is most likely due to cross-
subsidisation by the owners, most of whom either have 
other work or are retired. In the model, these boats were not 
economically viable in the long run, and hence were largely 
removed in the long run equilibrium simulation. 
 
As these boats are most likely cross-subsidised, it is not 
likely that they would all leave the fishery in the long run, 
as the owners may get some non-market benefit by 
remaining in the fishery. However, these boats no doubt 
add to the cost of fisheries management. If costs are 
proportional to boat numbers, then the costs of managing 
these boats no doubt exceeds the market benefits they 
generate, and may even exceed any non-market benefits to 
their owners.  
 
Levying a charge on these boats would result in most of 
them becoming more unprofitable, and may result in the 
large reduction in boat numbers estimated using the model. 
This raises the issue as to whether the UK wishes to have a 
smaller professional fleet, or a larger fleet that adds little 
direct economic value, but may add indirect value through 
maintaining the illusion that many small coastal 
communities are fishing communities, hence attracting 
tourism to the area. This is an issue that is well beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
As would be expected, the imposition of a levy on the UK 
fleet made these boats less competitive in the model, IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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resulting in a reduction in their numbers. Also as expected, 
the reduction in UK fleet numbers was estimated to have a 
direct benefit to the French fleet, who were not subject to 
any levy. In such a case, it is unlikely that a management 
cost recovery scheme could be implemented unilaterally as 
the UK fishing industry would vehemently oppose a policy 
that was both to their detriment and to the benefit of another 
EU member state. 
 
An unexpected result was that imposing an equivalent levy 
on the French fleet did not have any impact on this fleet. 
This was largely because the fleet as a whole were making 
a profit greater than the levy revenue collected. 
 
This last result may be an artefact of the model. Because of 
the large number of non-linearities in the model, individual 
boat group profits could not be estimated directly within the 
optimisation procedure. Instead, only an aggregate UK and 
French profit could be estimated separately. Hence, the 
constraint placed on the model was that total profits of each 
fleet were greater than zero. As a result, fleet segments that 
were profitable could offset those that made a loss once a 
levy was introduced, resulting in no loss in boat numbers. 
Consequently, some adjustment in the French fleet may 
have been observed in the model results had individual 
profits been constrained to be non-negative.
9  
 
The analysis has not looked at the efficiency of 
management. An assumption has been that the costs of 
management are given, and that these could not be reduced 
through more effective management strategies. Andersen et 
al (1998) suggested that who pays and how they pay 
influence the actual costs of management. Public provision 
of management services may lead to inefficient use of 
research and excessive levels of enforcement resources 
(Andersen et al 1998). Further, the analysis has not looked 
at how much of the costs of management should be borne 
by fishers. Department of Primary Industries and Energy 
(1994) concluded that not all costs of management are 
attributable to fishers, as some have a public good element. 
This includes some research and enforcement activities. 
 
Imposing a management charge on a country basis in an 
international fishery may not be appropriate as differences 
in the supply of management services will affect the costs, 
and hence competitiveness of the individual fleets. Further, 
the benefits of effective management at the country level 
also accrue to the other participants in the fishery. For 
example, enforcement activities by the UK not only protect 
                                                        
9 A version of the model using a genetic algorithm (rather 
than traditional optimising technique) has been developed 
that could over come this difficulty. However, the results 
from this model were not available in time for the 
Conference. As a consequence, the results presented in this 
study should be viewed as preliminary and subject to 
change. 
UK interests, but also the interests of the French fleet who 
are sharing the resource.  
 
For effective cost recovery in international fisheries, such 
as those in European waters, management must be co-
ordinated and the total cost of all management services (i.e. 
from all countries) needs to be shared proportionally (and 
equitably) between all participants. This effectively requires 
fisheries to be managed regionally, with one co-ordinating 
body having overall management jurisdiction for the fishery 
being managed. Under the current European management 
framework, this is not possible. As a result, it is unlikely 
that cost recovery will be implemented in European 
fisheries until such a management structure can be 
developed. 
 
The model results presented here should be considered only 
indicative of the effects of implementing a unilateral cost 
recovery levy on the UK fleet operating in the English 
Channel. Nevertheless, the model results do reinforce the 
conclusion that unilateral cost recovery in an international 
fishery is unlikely to take place. 
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